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ABSTRACT 
 
We empirically investigate one form of illegal investor-level tax evasion and its effect on foreign 
portfolio investment. In particular, we examine a form of round-tripping tax evasion in which 
U.S. individuals hide funds in entities located in offshore tax havens and then invest those funds 
in U.S. securities markets. Employing Becker’s (1968) economic theory of crime, we identify the 
tax evasion component in foreign portfolio investment data by examining how foreign portfolio 
investment varies with changes in the incentives to evade and the risks of detection. To our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence of investor-level tax evasion affecting cross-
border investment in equity and debt markets. 
 
 
 
*Hanlon is with the Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Maydew is with the 
Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Thornock is with the Foster School of 
Business, University of Washington. We appreciate comments from Bob Bowen, Dhammika Dharmapala 
(discussant), John Gallemore, Jeremiah Green, Cam Harvey (editor), Frank Hodge, Jeff Hoopes, Dawn Matsumoto, 
Lil Mills, Terry Shevlin, D. Shores, Stephan Siegel, Joel Slemrod, Erin Towery, Luke Watson, Brady Williams, 
Jeffrey Wooldridge, three anonymous referees, two associate editors, an advisor, seminar participants at the 2010 
National Tax Association meetings, EIASM 2011 Workshop on Current Research on Taxation at the University of 
Münster, Columbia University, Internal Revenue Service, New York University Law School Colloquium, 
Northwestern University, Pennsylvania State University, Rice University, Texas A&M University, University of 
Chicago, University of Texas at Austin, University of Utah and University of Washington, and staff of the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.  
  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915429
 
1 
 
While taxes have played an important part in the finance literature for decades, the focus 
to date has been almost exclusively on the implications of the tax laws as legally applied. The 
effects of tax evasion – the illegal reduction of taxes – on financial decisions have gone largely 
unexplored. In this paper, we investigate one form of investor-level tax evasion and its effect on 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI). Specifically, we empirically examine a method of offshore 
tax evasion we call “round-tripping,” in which U.S. individuals hide funds in tax haven entities 
and then reinvest those funds in U.S. stocks and bonds. By making it appear that the investments 
are coming from true foreign investors, the individuals are able to evade most tax on the 
investment income because the U.S. taxes foreign investors in U.S. securities much more 
favorably than domestic investors.
1
  
The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations stressed the importance of 
obtaining empirical evidence about offshore tax evasion, writing “Offshore tax havens today 
hold trillions of dollars in assets provided by citizens of other countries, including the United 
States. The extent to which those assets represent funds hidden from tax authorities…is of 
critical importance” (U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2008).2 However, 
other than anecdotal evidence from cases where tax evaders have been caught, there is 
essentially no systematic evidence of the effects of tax evasion on FPI. The lack of empirical 
evidence is due, no doubt, to the nature of tax evasion as an illegal activity shrouded in secrecy. 
The very factors that protect the tax evader (i.e., bank secrecy laws and lack of information 
sharing with the tax authorities of other nations) also make it difficult for researchers to study 
offshore tax evasion. Consequently, despite decades of concern by governments as well as 
efforts to curtail such evasion, there is little empirical evidence about offshore tax evasion and 
none about its effects on international portfolio investment. Equally unknown is the behavioral 
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response of tax evaders to changes in tax rates and enforcement over time. The purpose of this 
study is to provide initial evidence on these issues. 
Our empirical analysis takes advantage of inbound portfolio investment data (from both 
havens and non-havens) collected by the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury. FPI is defined 
as foreign investment of less than 10% ownership of a corporation. In our sample, FPI in U.S. 
debt and equities totaled approximately $3.4 trillion in 2008, of which approximately $1.2 
trillion came from tax havens.
3
 It is important to note that much of the FPI has nothing to do with 
tax evasion and is simply the result of investment decisions and portfolio allocations, largely to 
and from our major trading partners, such as Canada, the U.K., and Japan. Even where FPI 
travels through tax havens, in many cases it could be for non-evasion reasons, including 
regulatory reasons and legal tax avoidance.  
 Our identification strategy applies the economic theory of crime pioneered by Becker 
(1968) and extended to the realm of tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and others 
(see Slemrod (2007)). Specifically, would-be tax evaders face a tension between the expected tax 
savings from engaging in tax evasion and the expected costs. In order to separate evasion-related 
FPI from FPI that takes place for other (legal and illegal) reasons, we employ measures of the 
benefits and costs of evasion that are unlikely to be related to other motivations for FPI. Our 
measures of the benefits of evading U.S. tax are the U.S. ordinary and capital gains tax rates over 
time. In periods when taxes on capital gains and interest income are high, there are more benefits 
from evading U.S. tax on portfolio investment. Using U.S. ordinary and capital gains tax rates 
helps in the identification of U.S. tax evasion because U.S. investors are subject to those taxes 
but foreign investors in U.S. securities generally are not.
4
 If U.S. investors are disguising 
themselves as foreign investors, then we expect to see more FPI into the U.S. when U.S. capital 
 3 
 
gains and ordinary tax rates increase. We expect this effect to be greater for FPI from tax haven 
nations relative to non-haven nations because tax evaders will be attracted to low-tax foreign 
jurisdictions.
5
   
We measure the risk of getting caught using enforcement efforts that vary over time and 
across countries. We examine two major sets of changes in enforcement: the enactment of 
bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) between the U.S. and certain tax 
havens, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) actions that 
increased the focus on tax haven nations. Bilateral information sharing agreements between the 
U.S. and a tax haven increase the risk of detection for U.S. tax evaders, but should not affect 
“true” foreign investors. We also test the OECD dates, which are not U.S.-specific but are more 
general indications of greater enforcement on tax evasion transactions. Our tests control for other 
factors associated with FPI, including time fixed effects, country fixed effects, and time-varying 
country-specific effects (e.g., local tax rates, GDP, population, communications infrastructure, 
and exchange rates). In addition, we conduct a battery of robustness tests, including tests that 
control for investing activity of pensions and hedge funds that often occurs in tax havens but is 
unrelated to round-tripping.    
We report two main findings. First, increases in U.S. ordinary and capital gains tax rates 
are associated with increases in inbound FPI from haven countries. These results are consistent 
with a portion of the inbound portfolio investment from tax havens actually being from U.S. tax 
evaders, rather than “true” foreign investors. We estimate that a 1% increase in the top U.S 
ordinary tax rate results in an approximate 2.1% to 2.8% increase in inbound equity FPI from tax 
havens relative to non-havens, depending on the specification. Thus, the effect of round-tripping 
tax evasion on FPI is economically meaningful. Second, we find that engaging in information 
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sharing agreements with tax havens decreases inbound portfolio investment from those havens. 
Specifically, we estimate that engaging in a TIEA with a tax haven results in a decrease in 
inbound equity FPI from those tax havens ranging from 20.6% to 32.6%, and a decrease in debt 
FPI ranging from zero to 32.5%, depending on the specification. To our knowledge, these are the 
first large-sample empirical estimates of investor-level tax evasion affecting cross-border 
investment in debt and equity securities.
6
 
A variety of other economic magnitudes can be estimated from the results, including the 
estimated effects of TIEAs and the estimated lost U.S. tax revenue. During our sample period, 
the U.S. entered into four information exchange agreements with tax havens, but many tax 
havens still do not have TIEAs with the U.S. As of 2008, tax havens in our sample without TIEA 
agreements accounted for approximately $337 billion of inbound FPI to the U.S. Applying the 
range of estimates from the TIEA tests to the remaining tax havens suggests that approximately 
$34 billion to $109 billion of FPI from those tax havens may be due to round-tripping tax 
evasion. The estimated tax revenue lost due to such evasion requires additional assumptions and 
can be thought of in two parts. One, if the funds transferred offshore were from income that was 
never declared to the tax authorities, it would be reasonable to estimate a tax revenue loss of $8 
billion to $27 billion. Two, there is ongoing annual tax revenue lost from not reporting the 
income on the investments. A reasonable estimate of the expected annual tax evaded on this 
investment income is on the order of $1 billion to $2 billion.
7
 It is important to keep in mind that 
these are not designed to be overall estimates of cross-border tax evasion. Our estimates only 
include round-tripping tax evasion taking place through tax havens in our sample that have not 
signed TIEAs with the U.S. While these magnitudes should be interpreted with an appropriate 
amount of caution, they lead to at least two implications. First, cross-border tax evasion plays an 
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important but not well-understood role in international finance by influencing the amount and 
location of portfolio investment. Second, policymakers may find increases in information 
exchange and enforcement a fruitful area for improving tax compliance, particularly given the 
anticipated future tax revenue needs to reduce deficits.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of taxation on financial decisions, 
particularly cross-border taxation on equity markets. Even with the rising importance of FPI, the 
taxation of foreign portfolio income has largely been ignored until recently (Graetz and Grinberg 
(2003)). The literature on cross-border taxation and equity markets has examined topics such as 
dividend tax arbitrage (McDonald (2001)), tax effects on ex-day behavior of ADR securities 
(Callaghan and Barry (2003)), the effects of dividend taxation on FPI (Amiram and Frank 
(2010)), the effect on worldwide portfolio allocation surrounding the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act (Desai and Dharmapala (2011)), and effects of changes in the 
corporate taxation of foreign earnings on dividend payout and share repurchases (Dharmapala, 
Foley, and Forbes (2011)). While these papers advance our understanding of the effects of 
taxation in international portfolio investment, none of these papers examines the effects of tax 
evasion. The literature is silent when it comes to evidence on cross-border tax evasion in equity 
or debt markets (or, for that matter, evasion in derivatives, commodities, or real asset markets). 
There have been two review papers that discuss the relevant issues. Dharmapala (2009) 
reviews the literature surrounding tax havens and of tax haven activities in terms of both 
corporate and individual investor tax planning.
8
 Gravelle (2009) also provides a review of 
international tax avoidance and discusses individual tax evasion and the legislative attempts to 
curtail such evasion. Overall, these papers provide valuable summaries of the literature and 
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discussion of the issues, but neither is intended to provide an empirical investigation of tax 
evasion and examination of the effects of tax evasion on FPI. This is what we do in our paper. 
In terms of the broader literature on tax aggressiveness, Graham and Tucker (2006), 
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), Lisowsky (2010), and others examine corporations engaging in tax 
shelters and the related effects. Our paper also examines tax-aggressive behavior but is different 
from these papers in at least two respects. First, our paper provides evidence on tax evasion, an 
illegal activity that is beyond aggressive, but legal, tax strategies evaluated in prior research. 
Second, our paper provides evidence on investor-level behavior rather than corporate-level 
behavior. In that sense, our paper also contributes to the growing literature in personal finance. 
The typical paper in that field examines the factors that influence household portfolio choices. 
Some studies consider the influence of taxation on investment decisions, but even these say little 
about the possibility of tax evasion, and more directly, how incentives for tax evasion influence 
the average investor’s investment decisions. Our evidence is consistent with tax evasion playing 
a significant role in the timing, method, and extent of investments into domestic securities. 
Although it is not surprising that some offshore tax evasion occurs, there is no large scale 
evidence of its effects or its determinants. Thus, we provide new insights into an important factor 
in household investment decisions. Finally, the results have implications for the home-bias 
literature, suggesting that home-bias is stronger than previously determined from the data, 
because some of what appears to be foreign investment is actually coming from domestic 
investors evading taxes. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we briefly describe how offshore tax evasion 
takes place and the laws and efforts to prevent it. In Section II we develop our hypotheses and in 
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Section III we describe our research design. Section IV presents our empirical analysis and 
Section V concludes.   
I. Background and Institutional Details 
A. Offshore tax evasion and round-tripping 
 
This section briefly describes how individuals actually evade taxes with offshore round-
tripping transactions. A simple hypothetical can illustrate the key aspects of offshore tax evasion 
via round-tripping. A U.S. individual sets up a foreign corporation, in Bermuda for example, and 
opens a bank account, also in Bermuda, in the name of the corporation. All this can be done over 
the Internet for a small fee. The individual transfers funds to the bank account of the Bermuda 
corporation and has the Bermuda corporation make investments in the U.S. and other countries.
9
 
Because the account is in Bermuda where tax rates are zero, the person pays no local taxes on the 
income attributable to the account. 
Moreover, an individual engaging in such a scheme can save a great deal of U.S. taxes. 
By disguising the investment as being from a foreign corporation or nonresident alien, taxes on 
interest income and trading gains are not paid because foreign corporations (not controlled by 
U.S. persons) and nonresident alien individuals are generally not subject to U.S. income tax on 
the interest and capital gains income from the U.S. stock and bond investments. Once the 
individual has gone down the path of tax evasion, the true taxes due are likely never to be paid 
other than through discovery or initiatives by the tax authorities. Individuals have devised a 
number of ways to eventually access the offshore funds without declaring them, including access 
through credit cards and ATMs in the U.S. or abroad, gift cards, prepaid cards, smuggling the 
cash or assets into the U.S., or simply spending the funds outside the U.S.
10
 The U.S. will, 
however, collect a withholding tax on any dividend income paid to foreign investors, including 
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foreign corporations created by U.S. individuals for round-tripping. The default dividend 
withholding tax rate is 30%. 
B. Lack of information and efforts to detect and prevent offshore tax evasion 
 
Offshore tax havens have historically thrived on secrecy. Detection of offshore tax 
evasion is difficult because the U.S. relies largely on self-reporting and does not require 
withholding taxes on most interest income and capital gains. Even if the authorities learn of the 
existence of an offshore entity, the process to obtain information about the owners of the entity is 
difficult and time consuming. In addition, audits involving offshore tax evasion are more 
challenging, require highly trained IRS agents, and take longer to conduct.  
Arguably the most visible initiative against tax havens was undertaken by the OECD. The 
OECD mounted an anti-tax haven effort starting in 1998, when it established a working group to 
focus on “harmful tax practices” (OECD (1998)). In 2000, the OECD issued a report that listed 
35 jurisdictions as tax havens, pressured the tax havens to adopt certain practices of cooperation 
and transparency, and warned that countries that did not cooperate would be placed on a list of 
uncooperative tax havens. In 2001, the pressure on havens increased, as the OECD established a 
group to develop new standards for effective information exchange, met with officials from each 
of the tax havens to discuss conditions for removal from the list, and established when 
coordinated defensive measures could be taken against uncooperative tax havens.   
Over time countries were removed from the blacklist as they agreed to OECD reforms, 
including entering into a sufficient number of TIEAs (described below) with other countries. By 
2002, 31 of the countries had agreed to cooperate with the OECD, though implementation in 
some cases took much longer. By April 2009, there were no countries on the OECD blacklist and 
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only four countries on the grey list (Costa Rica, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Uruguay) and 
those were labeled as “other financial centers” rather than tax havens. 
In large part due to the OECD efforts, there has been a significant increase in the number 
of TIEAs between the U.S. and countries that were identified as tax havens. In general, TIEAs 
provide for sharing of tax information between the countries to assist in tax enforcement. 
Although TIEAs represent a step forward, TIEAs have many major limitations, foremost of 
which is that the information exchange usually only takes place upon request, which is difficult 
without information about who is avoiding tax in the first place. A second major limitation is that 
bank secrecy laws in the foreign country are unaffected by the TIEA. A third limitation is that 
the tax haven country might not have useful information to share. For example, the British 
Virgin Islands has hundreds of thousands of registered corporations but the country requires 
neither identification of shareholders or directors nor any financial records (Sullivan (2009)). 
Thus, an information request to the British Virgin Islands may not yield much usable information 
because the information is not even collected by the tax haven. On the other hand, even a small 
chance of detection may be enough to drive away would-be tax evaders. Indeed, a 2007 guide to 
tax havens advises people interested in confidentiality to avoid tax havens that have signed 
TIEAs stating “…you should not do business with a TIEA tax haven…this device has 
undermined once good tax havens” (Barber (2007; p. 127)). Thus, while some commentators are 
skeptical of the effectiveness of TIEAs (e.g., Sheppard (2009); Kudrle (2008)), TIEAs may have 
an effect in practice.  
Although efforts to curtail offshore tax evasion have increased in recent years, historically 
the perception has been that enforcement efforts with regard to offshore tax evasion have been 
weak. Lax enforcement may be efficient if the costs of increasing enforcement would exceed the 
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benefits (Slemrod (2007)). However, because little is known about the magnitude of offshore tax 
evasion, it is impossible to know whether this is the case. Our study provides initial evidence 
about one type of offshore tax evasion – its existence, its magnitude, and its effect on portfolio 
investment – in an effort to begin to inform the debate.    
II. Hypotheses 
 Our hypotheses are based on the economic theory of crime pioneered by Becker (1968) 
and extended to the realm of tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and others (see 
Slemrod (2007)). Under the economic theory of crime, would-be tax evaders optimize their tax 
evasion based on the marginal benefits and marginal costs of evasion. Tax evaders thus face a 
tension between the expected tax savings from engaging in tax evasion and the expected costs, 
which can include fines, penalties, and prison sentences. In our setting, we can observe shifts in 
both the benefits and the expected costs of tax evasion, and as a result, we make two predictions. 
Our first prediction focuses on the expected benefits of engaging in offshore tax evasion. As U.S. 
tax rates increase, the incentives also increase for U.S. citizens and residents to evade taxes by 
round-tripping their investments through foreign entities in tax havens. However, increases in 
U.S. tax rates should have no effect on true foreign investors, as they generally are not subject to 
U.S. taxes (other than withholding taxes). Thus, our first hypothesis is that FPI into the U.S. from 
tax havens is increasing in U.S. tax rates. 
H1: Foreign portfolio investment into the U.S. from tax havens is increasing in U.S. tax 
rates. 
 
If the data are consistent with our first hypothesis, it will provide evidence that offshore round-
tripping occurs and that such offshore round-tripping tax evasion affects foreign investment in 
U.S. debt and equity securities.   
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 Our second hypothesis focuses on shifts in the expected costs of tax evasion, primarily 
shifts in the probability of being discovered by the tax authorities. We examine several shifts in 
the likelihood of detection, all of which are events that signal increased efforts at stopping tax 
evasion through tax havens. The first events are the enactment of TIEAs between the U.S. and 
individual tax havens. The second events are increases in scrutiny of tax havens by the OECD in 
1998 and 2001, as discussed above. We use these event dates as proxies for an increase in the 
expected likelihood of detection (i.e., the expected costs). We predict that the reduction in the 
secrecy afforded to would-be tax evaders has a negative effect on the amount of FPI into the U.S. 
from a tax haven.  
H2: Foreign portfolio investment into the U.S. from tax havens is decreasing in information-
sharing initiatives with tax havens. 
 
Similar to our H1, if the data are consistent with H2, it will provide joint evidence that offshore 
round-tripping occurs and that such offshore round-tripping tax evasion affects FPI.   
III. Research Design 
A. Test of the effect of U.S. tax rates on FPI (Hypothesis 1) 
Our first empirical specification tests the effect of greater incentives to evade U.S. 
taxation, where the incentives to evade are measured by the U.S. tax rate. Again, the intuition 
behind the identification strategy is that U.S. tax rates only affect U.S. taxpayers – investors from 
other countries should be indifferent to changes in tax rates to which they are not subject. Thus, 
if changes in haven-sourced FPI into the U.S. vary with changes in the U.S. tax rate, this 
variation can be attributed to evasion by U.S. tax payers. As a result, we estimate the following 
equation: 
Log(FPIi,t) = country + year-monthHAVENi*TAXRATEt + KControlsi,t + i,t  
      
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We examine both equity and debt FPI. Log(FPIi,t) in equity (debt) securities is the natural log of 
the market value of monthly foreign holdings of U.S. stocks (U.S. corporate bonds) from country 
i as of year-month t. These data are gathered from the Federal Reserve Board and are described 
in detail below. HAVENi is an indicator variable set equal to one if country i is identified as a tax 
haven and set to zero otherwise. We follow Dharmapala (2009) and define a country as a tax 
haven if it was listed on the 1998 OECD report on tax havens or if it was included in the list 
provided by Hines and Rice (1994) (see Table I for our classification).  
We include time fixed effects (year-month) for each year-month to control for time-varying 
changes in FPI. For example, the time fixed effects account for changes in the level of the U.S. 
capital markets across time (at the monthly level), which is equivalent to including a control for 
the monthly level of the S&P 500 index. We include country fixed effects (country) to control for 
FPI that is due to stationary characteristics of the country, such as language, distance, weather, 
legal origin, etc.
11
 As noted in Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2011), the extensive structure of the 
country and time fixed effects is very demanding and could capture some of the treatment effect 
of changes in regulatory enforcement, in our case, signing of TIEAs or increased OECD 
scrutiny. Main effects for HAVEN or TAXRATE are also captured by the country and year-month 
fixed effects.
 
We predict a positive coefficient on the HAVENi*TAXRATEt interaction variable 
because as U.S. tax rates on U.S. investment increase, the incentives to evade the taxes via a tax 
haven increase.  
We examine two measures of TAXRATEt: LTCG RATE is the U.S. tax rate at time t 
applicable to long-term capital gains; ORD RATE is the top statutory U.S. ordinary income tax 
rate applicable at time t to ordinary income (e.g., interest income and short-term capital gains). 
We test the effect of the ordinary tax rate and the long-term capital gains rates on both debt and 
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equity FPI. It is important to note that the tax rates represent the tax avoided by the tax evader. 
For example, the ordinary tax rate applies to interest income from debt securities owned by U.S. 
investors (with no evasion). The ordinary tax rate also applies to short-term capital gains that a 
U.S. investor earns; thus, any rapid trading of securities is subject to such a rate. The long-term 
capital gains tax rate applies to gains from the sale of stocks or bonds held in excess of 12 
months for most of our sample period. These are the taxes evaded by going offshore.
12
 Thus, if 
tax evasion is occurring in a manner described above (i.e., round-tripping), then as U.S. tax rates 
increase, the benefits of avoidance increase, and FPI from haven locations should increase. We 
expect the increase to be in haven locations and not non-haven locations because the tax evader 
will owe little to no tax in a haven country.
13
  
In addition to the time and country fixed effects, we control for five potential 
determinants of portfolio investment into the U.S: GDP, population, local tax rates, phone 
coverage, and foreign exchange rates. Country-specific variables are difficult to obtain for small 
countries such as tax havens, thus we include these particular variables both because of coverage 
and for their ability to proxy for the typical drivers of foreign investment. Following Desai and 
Dharmapala (2011), we include the log of country i’s gross domestic product in year t, 
LOGGDP, and the log of the country i’s population in year t, LOGPOP. We obtain GDP data 
from the World Bank database and population data from the United Nations database.
14
 When 
the data are not available at these sources, we obtain the data from the International Monetary 
Fund and the CIA World Factbook database.
15
 We also include annual tax rates from the country 
of origin, LOCAL TAX RATE, which are obtained from the OECD, the World Tax Database and 
KPMG.
16
 We also include the interaction, HAVEN*LOCAL TAX RATE, to account for the 
potential confounding effect that U.S. tax rates and home country tax rates move in tandem. We 
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include phone coverage, LOG PHONE, as a proxy for technological development; LOG PHONE 
is measured as the natural log of the annual number of fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants, as reported by the United Nations database. Finally, we include annual foreign 
exchange rates from Compustat, EXCH RATE, to account for the effect of country-specific 
currency fluctuations on FPI.
17
   
B. Test of the effect of increases in expected probability of detection on FPI (Hypothesis 2) 
Our second hypothesis predicts that as the likelihood of detection increases, the level of 
FPI into the U.S. through offshore havens should decrease if any of the FPI is due to U.S. tax 
evasion. As our proxy of increased probability of detection, we use two sets of event dates 
associated with increased scrutiny of tax havens and employ interrupted time-series and 
difference-in-differences tests to examine the variation in FPI through havens versus non-havens 
following these events. The model is as follows: 
Log(FPIi,t) = country+ year-monthHAVENi*POSTt + KControlsi,t + i,t  
 
Depending on the specification, POST takes on a value of one for the time period after each of 
the two events: the signing of TIEAs with the U.S or the initiation of OECD enforcement 
actions. For TIEAs, the event is the month and year in which the U.S. signed a tax information 
sharing agreement with a particular country (POSTCONTRACT) and the year-month in which 
the agreement went into effect (POSTEFFECTIVE). In this test, the year-month of POST is 
specific to, and varies by, the country from which the FPI originates. Most of the countries in the 
sample, including several tax haven countries, have never signed TIEAs with the U.S., which 
results in a POST variable that is always zero for those countries.
18
  
For the OECD scrutiny, we create indicator variables for the two years during which the 
OECD announced it would increase enforcement of tax avoidance via tax havens (POST1998 
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and POST2001), where POST is set to one after 1998 (and separately after 2001) and zero before 
those years. Similar to equation (1), we include time and country fixed effects to control for 
country and time factors, as well as controls for GDP, population, local tax rates, phone 
coverage, and foreign exchange rates. 
Overall, if the increase in enforcement from these events increases the expected 
likelihood of detection (i.e., the agreements are effective) and tax evasion is occurring in our 
data, then inbound FPI should decrease after the signing of the agreement or after its effective 
date (as long as the increased costs become greater than the benefits for some of the investors). 
In the regression, a negative coefficient on the POST variables for the haven locations, relative to 
non-haven locations, is consistent with investment from the haven countries declining after tax 
evasion becomes more costly. Finally, we estimate a model that includes both the effects of 
TIEA enforcement and the effects of tax rate changes (costs and benefits) on FPI from havens 
versus non-havens.   
 Several caveats with respect to these tests are in order. First, to the extent that the OECD 
announcements of greater scrutiny and the tax information sharing agreements are ineffective, 
we do not expect any decrease in evasion activities. In other words, unless these events credibly 
increase expected costs of evasion, there will not be an effect on the extent of tax haven use to 
evade taxes. Second, these tests are interrupted time series tests that are susceptible to 
confounding events problems. If other factors that affect the level of FPI occur at roughly the 
same time and cause FPI from tax havens to decline (i.e., change in the same direction as an 
increase in tax authority scrutiny) more than non-havens, then we could attribute the observed 
behavior in the pattern of FPI from tax havens to tax evasion by U.S. individuals when it is really 
attributable to something else. Similarly, if there is a time trend that operates in the same 
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direction as our tests predict and it is specific to the tax havens affected by the enforcement 
activities, then it is possible that we pick up that trend. In addition, we cannot effectively control 
for changes in enforcement by other countries, and some of what we detect could be from 
foreign tax evasion. Of some comfort is that all of our events increase enforcement, which would 
yield decreasing investment. The time trend in FPI, in contrast, is generally increasing. Thus, the 
general time trend is, at least from this aspect, not a concern. In addition, our research design 
compares tax haven locations to non-haven locations, which is important because it isolates the 
effect attributable to the tax haven nature of the country and the resulting ability to accomplish 
tax evasion. In our robustness section below, we attempt to rule out as many of the above 
problems as possible, but to the extent we cannot, our results should be interpreted with care.  
IV. Empirical Analysis 
A. Data and sample 
 Our primary source of data is monthly estimates of U.S. securities positions held by 
foreign investors, as reported by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), following Curcuru, Thomas, 
Warnock, and Wongswan (2011). These data are based on periodic surveys of foreign holdings 
of U.S. securities that occurred, until recently, only once every five years. They are now reported 
annually. However, foreign portfolio flows (as opposed to levels) are reported on a monthly 
basis. Thus, to arrive at a more frequent measure of levels of FPI, the FRB combines annual 
survey data of securities positions released by the U.S. Treasury International Capital System 
(TIC) with monthly transaction data released by the Treasury. That is, the annual level of FPI is 
combined with the monthly flow of FPI to arrive at a monthly level of FPI. The annual data from 
TIC are based on surveys of U.S.-based banks, broker-dealers, and financial institutions that 
have custody of U.S. equities and debt held by foreigners. Fulfilling the survey requirements by 
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U.S. custodians is mandatory under the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey 
Act, with severe penalties attached for failure to comply.
19
 As a result, the annual levels data are 
considered reliable and have been used extensively in recent research examining international 
portfolio investment (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala (2011); Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan 
(2006)). The monthly transaction data from the Treasury are based on a mandatory, monthly TIC 
survey filed by U.S. banks, securities dealers, and other entities.
20
 Respondents to the surveys 
report the amount of transactions of four types of U.S. securities held by foreigners: equity, debt 
issued by U.S. corporations, U.S. Treasury debt, and U.S. government agency debt.
21
 We focus 
our analysis on foreign holdings of U.S. equity and corporate debt because these are more likely 
to be held by individual investors, whereas U.S. Treasury and U.S. agency debt are often held by 
foreign governments. 
In sum, the FRB combines low frequency data detailing the positions of foreigners in 
U.S. securities with high frequency transactions data. These data provide a monthly time series 
of estimated levels of foreign holdings of U.S. corporate bonds, U.S. equity securities, U.S. 
agency bonds, and U.S. Treasury bonds for about 80 countries over the time period 1984 to 
2008. The data are available to the public on a website hosted by the FRB.
22
 Because of the 
corrections to the well-known biases in international portfolio flow data (e.g., financial center 
bias), the long time series and the broad cross section of countries covered, the FRB estimates of 
monthly positions of foreign investors in U.S. equity and debt securities represent the best 
available data on portfolio holdings.
23
  
 Bertaut and Tryon (2007) describe a potential bias in the data called the “custodial bias,” 
in which the origin of the FPI is in question. This bias, which has long been recognized in the 
literature, arises because investors often use foreign banks to maintain custody of their shares in 
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countries other than their own. Thus, the investments in U.S securities by a U.S. investor with 
equities in custody at a Bermudan bank would be attributed to Bermuda rather than U.S. In our 
study, we exploit custodial bias by examining how investors sourced to havens react to changes 
in U.S. tax law; the portion that is sensitive to U.S. tax law and enforcement changes we interpret 
as being sourced to U.S. investors evading the U.S. income tax.   
 We make two adjustments to the data. First, we remove observations not clearly 
associated with a particular country. Specifically, we exclude observations from country groups 
reported in the FRB dataset, such as “African Oil Exporters” and “Other Europe,” and exclude 
countries that are grouped together where one is a haven and the other is not, such as Belgium 
and Luxembourg. Second, we exclude observations with insufficient data for our control 
variables.   
B. Descriptive statistics 
Table I provides descriptive statistics of our variables for each country from which the 
inbound (to the U.S.) FPI is sourced. Specifically, for each country in our dataset, the table 
shows whether the country is a HAVEN in our study (1 = yes), the mean monthly equity FPI 
from the country over our sample period (1984 to 2008), the mean monthly debt FPI over our 
sample period, the mean population of the country over the sample period, and the mean GDP of 
the country during our sample period. Of the 59 countries for which we have data, 12 are tax 
haven countries. The United Kingdom has the highest level of equity FPI inbound into the U.S. 
in the sample, with Ghana exhibiting the lowest. China is the most populous country in the 
sample, while the Cayman Islands is the least populous country in the sample. Japan has the 
highest average GDP, while Liberia has the lowest average GDP. Hence, the sample exhibits 
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considerable cross-sectional variation in all of our variables of interest. Panel B of Table I 
presents the U.S. individual tax rates in effect over our sample years.  
In Figure 1, we present a graph of the log of the average ratio of equity FPI to the 
population of the country, with haven countries identified as darkly shaded bars. Figure 2 reports 
the unscaled dollar amount of equity FPI from each of the countries in our sample as of 2008. 
Predictably, countries with large economies and trade with the United States occupy many of the 
top positions in terms of equity FPI into the United States, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and Japan. In both figures, the disproportionate amount of investment coming from tax havens is 
clear. For example, in Figure 1, we see that the Cayman Islands and Bermuda occupy the top two 
positions, having the greatest amounts of FPI into the U.S. relative to their populations.  
These descriptive statistics are not evidence of tax evasion, however, since there can be 
both regulatory reasons and legal tax avoidance reasons for investment through tax havens (e.g., 
Guttentag and Avi-Yonah (2005)). For example, the Cayman Islands is the location of choice for 
hedge funds. International Financial Services London (2010) reports that the Cayman Islands 
accounts for 39% of global hedge funds.
24
 In addition, Bandopadhyaya and Grant (2007) 
document similar results showing that 38% off all offshore funds are in the Cayman Islands, 
while other tax havens play a much smaller role in hedge funds, with 8% in the British Virgin 
Islands and 6% in Bermuda. Other sources document that the Cayman Islands have strong 
regulatory structures in place to assure investors that the managers of the offshore funds are 
legitimate. To mitigate concerns that our tests are somehow picking up investing by Cayman 
Island hedge funds rather than illegal tax evasion via round-tripping, we exclude the Cayman 
Islands from our regressions, though the primary results are robust to including or excluding the 
Cayman Islands, as reported in the Internet Appendix. 
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C. Test of Hypothesis 1: The effect of U.S. tax rates on inbound FPI   
Table II presents the results from estimating equation (1) for equity FPI (columns 1-4) 
and debt FPI (columns 5-8). All specifications include unreported controls for country and year-
month fixed effects and all are estimated using Prais-Winsten (1954) standard errors for panel 
data.
25
 Across all columns, the data reveal that the amount of equity FPI into the U.S. from haven 
locations varies positively with the U.S. ordinary income tax rates. Specifically, the coefficient 
on HAVEN*ORD RATE is positive and significant across each of the specifications, ranging 
from 0.023 to 0.039. The coefficient on the interaction HAVEN*LTCG RATE is positive and 
significant across each of the specifications, with coefficients ranging from 0.015 to 0.043. These 
results are consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 1 that a higher U.S. tax rate is associated 
with greater FPI from tax havens relative to non-havens. We interpret the results as evidence of 
tax evasion by U.S. individuals via haven locations and with the evasion increasing as the 
benefits increase (i.e., as the tax evaded increases). The economic magnitudes are meaningful, in 
that a 1% increase in ordinary tax rates in the U.S. is associated with an approximate 2.6% to 
3.6% greater increase in equity FPI and a 2.3% to 3.9% greater increase in debt FPI, depending 
on the specification, from tax havens relative to non-havens.  
D. Test of Hypothesis 2: The effect of an increase in detection risk on FPI 
 Table III presents regression results from our estimation of equation (2). Panel A presents 
the results in which increased enforcement is measured as the signing of a TIEA 
(POSTCONTRACT). Across each of the specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term, 
HAVEN*POSTCONTRACT, is negative and significant. Specifically, in Panel A, the coefficient 
on the interaction HAVEN*POSTCONTRACT takes on values from -0.253 to -0.601. The effects 
are economically significant and support the conclusion that TIEAs are successful, at least to 
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some extent, at curbing round-tripping tax evasion in the tax havens that agree to them. For 
example, results from Columns (2) and (6) indicate that following the contract date of the TIEA 
between the haven and the U.S., the inbound equity (debt) FPI from the tax haven decreases by 
approximately 38% (45%) relative to countries without TIEAs over the same time period.
26
 
Panel B of Table III presents the analogous tests using the effective date of the TIEAs in place of 
the signing date. Here again, the results indicate that entering into an information sharing 
agreement between the U.S. and a tax haven decreases the equity and debt FPI into the U.S. from 
the haven, consistent with a decrease in round-tripping through the haven. The coefficient on 
HAVEN*POSTEFFECTIVE is negative and significant across seven of eight specifications, with 
values ranging from -0.005 to -0.528.   
 Table IV presents the results of the estimation of equation (2) where the events of interest 
are the dates on which the OECD announced their watch lists for tax havens, as discussed above. 
This is a more general approach and the event date is not country specific to the U.S. Panel A 
presents the results for equity and debt FPI using POST1998 as the date of interest and Panel B 
presents the results for equity FPI and debt FPI using POST2001. The results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. In Panel A, the coefficients on the interaction term HAVEN*POST1998 are 
negative and significant across each specification for both equity and debt FPI, taking on values 
from -0.277 to -0.525, depending on the specification. These findings indicate reduced inbound 
FPI from tax haven countries after the increase in scrutiny from the OECD. Similar results obtain 
in Panel B; the coefficients on HAVEN*POST2001 are negative and significant across each of 
the specifications for equity FPI as well as for debt FPI. 
In Table V, we include both test variables, U.S. tax rates and the signing dates of the 
TIEA agreements. The results continue to be consistent with tax evasion having an effect on 
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inbound FPI. The coefficients on the interaction of HAVEN with both capital gains and ordinary 
tax rates are positive and significant. The coefficient on HAVEN*POSTCONTRACT is negative 
and significant in seven of eight specifications.  
E. Robustness tests 
E.1.  Hedge fund and pension investment 
 In this section, we discuss tests conducted to mitigate concerns about the effect of FPI 
from hedge funds and pension funds. For regulatory reasons, the structure of large hedge funds 
often includes an offshore fund (Stulz (2007)). In addition, pension funds often invest in hedge 
funds (or private equity funds or real estate funds) that are located offshore for legal tax 
avoidance reasons (i.e., to avoid the unrelated business income tax in the U.S.; for a detailed 
discussion, see Cauble (2009)). Thus, if for some reason investments in pensions or hedge funds 
vary with U.S. tax rates (or with TIEA or OECD events), it is possible that our results are 
affected by these non-evasion investments. In order to mitigate this concern, we run two separate 
robustness tests. 
 First, we include as an additional control the level of hedge fund assets under 
management in each country, according to the Lipper-Tass database.
27
 Unfortunately, the dataset 
covers only a small fraction of the countries and time periods in our original sample; the sample 
is reduced to 1,573 observations in this test. To retain as many observations as possible, we 
estimate a baseline version of equations (1) and (2) that includes controls for GDP, population, 
and the monthly level of hedge fund assets. After controlling for the level of hedge fund assets in 
each country, the tenor of the results (in the Internet Appendix) is unchanged. That is, we 
continue to find that FPI through tax havens is associated with the expected benefits and costs of 
tax evasion as predicted.   
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 Second, in a different estimation, we include as a control the level of pension investments 
in the U.S. Specifically, we include the log of the quarterly amount of total financial assets held 
by private pension funds in a given quarter as reported by the Federal Reserve. In estimating this 
specification, we omit the time fixed effects (because they are perfectly collinear with quarterly 
pension investment, which varies by time but not country) and instead include U.S. tax rates, 
population, GDP, the S&P 500 equity market return, and a basket of foreign exchange rates from 
the Federal Reserve. Again, we find that the tenor of the main results, as reported in the Internet 
Appendix, is unchanged. While holding constant the effect of total pension investment, FPI via 
tax havens is still increasing in U.S. tax rates and decreasing in tax enforcement measures (TIEA 
and OECD dates), consistent with round-tripping tax evasion by U.S. individuals.   
E.2.  Regional time trends 
 It is likely that different regions tend to invest in U.S. debt and equity securities at 
different rates over time. However, the fixed effect structure of our tests picks up shocks that 
affect all countries simultaneously. To the extent that any regional time trend is not accounted for 
by the fixed effects or the control variables, we potentially have an omitted correlated variable 
problem. To account for this possibility, in tests presented in the Internet Appendix, we introduce 
as control variables regional fixed effects that are interacted with a time trend variable. The 
results of this test reveal that the main inferences are unchanged—the regional time trends load 
significantly, but the main test variables also continue to load in the predicted directions. 
E.3.  Excluding non-haven countries 
 Next we provide an analysis estimating the effects within tax havens using the 
information sharing indicators (POSTCONTRACT and POSTEFFECTIVE) by excluding non-
haven countries from the analysis. This test is intended to mitigate concerns about tax havens 
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exhibiting different trends than non-tax havens in the information sharing part of the analysis. 
Note that estimating the regressions using only the tax havens is asking a lot from the data 
because we only have a small number of tax havens. We estimate the following regression in 
untabulated tests over the tax havens: 
 Log(FPIi,t) = country+ year-monthPOSTFFECTIVEt + KControlsi,t + i,t 

The variable of interest in this analysis is POSTEFFECTIVE, because there is no interaction to 
test without the non-haven control group. The results of this test are reported in the Internet 
Appendix. We find that the coefficient on POSTEFFECTIVE is negative and significant in four 
out of six specifications. Using the contract date of the information sharing agreement instead of 
the effective date, the POSTCONTRACT variable also is negative and significant in four of six 
specifications. Thus, the non-haven countries do not appear to be driving the results. 
E.4.  Randomized treatment group   
 To ensure that the effect we are observing is not somehow a mechanical relation in our 
exercise or data, we replicate our tests with only the non-haven countries. We randomly select 11 
countries from the non-haven group (the same number as we have actual havens in the sample, 
after the exclusion of the Cayman Islands) and we label these 11 randomly selected countries as 
havens. We then re-estimate an alternate version of equations (1) and (2) except that the HAVEN 
indicator is now set equal to one for 11 random “pseudo haven” locations and that LOGPOP and 
LOGGDP are the only independent variables (to maximize the sample). We then repeat the 
process 100 times and test whether the mean of the coefficients on the interactions with HAVEN 
are significantly different from zero. Absent a mechanical relation in the data, we expect to find 
the coefficients on the interactions with HAVEN to be equal to zero. The results of this 
robustness test, as presented in the Internet Appendix, are consistent with this prediction. We 
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find that the pseudo havens do not have FPI that is associated with changes in U.S. tax rates. Nor 
do the pseudo havens have changes in FPI following the signing of TIEAs for actual havens. We 
interpret this evidence as consistent with our inference that the patterns we observe are due to tax 
evasion via tax haven countries.  
V. Conclusion 
  This paper examines one form of offshore tax evasion and its effects on FPI. Specifically, 
we examine the effects of “round tripping” tax evasion in U.S. equity and debt markets, whereby 
U.S. individuals route their U.S. investments through entities in tax havens to appear as if they 
are foreign investors. Under the economic theory of crime as applied to tax evasion (Becker 
(1968), Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Slemrod (2007)), investors face a tension between the 
incentives to evade and the likelihood of being caught. We use variation in each to identify the 
extent to which FPI from tax havens is due to round-tripping tax evasion. We find evidence 
consistent with both the incentives to evade U.S. taxation (i.e., U.S. tax rates) and expected costs 
of evasion detection (i.e., increased enforcement efforts by world authorities) affecting the 
amount of FPI in U.S. debt and equity markets from tax havens. To our knowledge, this is the 
first empirical evidence of investor-level tax evasion affecting cross-border investment in equity 
and debt markets. Our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of taxation on financial 
decisions, particularly cross-border taxation on securities markets, as well as the growing 
literature on personal finance. Until now, the literature has focused on the effects of taxes as 
legally applied. We push the literature forward into examining the effects of tax evasion and 
provide new insights into an important factor in household investment decisions. Our findings 
have policy implications as well because they demonstrate both the tax revenue generated from 
information sharing agreements and the unintended tax revenue lost to offshore evasion when 
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increasing marginal tax rates. Finally, the results have implications for the home-bias literature, 
suggesting that home-bias is stronger than previously thought, as some of what appears to be 
foreign investment is actually coming from domestic investors who are evading taxes. 
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Figure 1 
Average Equity Foreign Portfolio Investment into the United States, scaled by Population  
In this figure, we present the average monthly U.S. inbound equity foreign portfolio investment for each country in the sample with non-zero values of FPI.  
Specifically, we take the log of the average ratio of equity FPI to population for each country.  The dark gray bars represent countries identified as tax havens and 
the light gray bars represent countries that are not considered tax havens. See Table I for the definition of HAVEN.    
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Figure 2 
Total Equity Foreign Portfolio Investment in 2008 into the United States - Unscaled 
In this figure, we present the U.S. inbound equity foreign portfolio investment at the end of 2008 for each country in the sample with non-zero values of FPI.  
Equity FPI is measured in billions of U.S. dollars. The dark gray bars represent countries identified as tax havens and the light gray bars represent countries that 
are not considered tax havens. See Table I for the definition of HAVEN.    
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics and Tax Rates 
In this table, we present country-level variables for the 59 countries in the sample (Panel A) as well as tax rates over 
the sample period, 1984-2008 (Panel B).  In Panel A, the first column presents an indicator for whether the country 
is considered a tax haven, HAVEN. This variable is equal to one if the country is identified in the 1999 OECD report 
or Hines and Rice (1994) as a tax haven and equal to zero otherwise. The next two columns present the average 
monthly equity and debt U.S. inbound foreign portfolio investment (FPI), as reported by the Federal Reserve Board.  
The final two columns present the average population and GDP of the country. FPI and GDP are presented in 
millions of U.S. dollars. In Panel B, we present the ordinary income and long-term capital gains tax rates for 
individuals over time. 
 
Panel A: Country Descriptive Statistics 
Country HAVEN 
Mean 
Equity FPI 
Mean Debt 
FPI 
Mean 
Population 
Mean 
 GDP 
Argentina 0 1,743 641 35,288,234 203,684 
Australia 0 23,493 4,803 18,448,743 417,651 
Austria 0 4,867 1,476 7,938,208 214,123 
Brazil 0 965 347 165,117,986 645,645 
Bulgaria 0 8 3 8,303,086 19,466 
Canada 0 120,711 22,260 29,706,545 722,903 
Chile 0 1,950 530 14,572,628 70,023 
China, Mainland 0 6,249 7,800 1,209,801,353 1,183,393 
Colombia 0 611 585 37,408,073 90,516 
Czech Republic 0 123 55 10,293,554 79,702 
Denmark 0 9,348 2,332 5,272,135 175,418 
Ecuador 0 167 122 11,513,778 21,755 
Egypt 0 169 198 65,883,036 71,754 
Finland 0 1,825 671 5,110,627 137,520 
France 0 37,022 12,718 58,323,345 1,500,516 
Germany 0 42,230 26,045 80,990,187 2,101,145 
Ghana 0 5 1 17,978,919 7,448 
Greece 0 729 91 10,634,863 146,676 
Guatemala 0 152 77 10,508,519 17,197 
Hungary 0 67 92 10,281,951 58,755 
India 0 328 66 955,352,745 484,703 
Indonesia 0 219 142 196,286,323 192,983 
Israel 0 2,960 1,150 5,731,652 94,141 
Italy 0 14,212 2,056 57,294,370 1,244,823 
Jamaica 0 72 31 2,509,946 7,251 
Japan 0 85,521 44,484 125,379,208 3,868,751 
Korea, South 0 896 2,002 45,278,415 481,559 
Mexico 0 4,988 3,214 92,152,122 489,180 
Morocco 0 46 11 26,816,891 38,421 
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Table I (continued) 
 
Country HAVEN 
Mean 
Equity FPI 
Mean Debt 
FPI 
Mean 
Population 
Mean 
 GDP 
Netherlands 0 67,870 18,481 15,554,533 414,857 
Norway 0 13,144 5,241 4,410,791 179,290 
Pakistan 0 85 67 128,165,631 69,528 
Peru 0 439 194 24,415,978 51,925 
Philippines 0 531 200 72,345,695 72,103 
Poland 0 93 74 38,200,844 173,991 
Portugal 0 976 496 10,180,917 115,942 
Romania 0 12 5 22,427,833 58,208 
South Africa 0 1,444 171 40,384,849 151,276 
Spain 0 3,787 2,163 40,466,238 682,870 
Sweden 0 19,966 3,576 8,779,005 265,312 
Syria 0 14 5 15,400,673 19,196 
Thailand 0 220 70 60,503,663 128,804 
Trinidad And Tobago 0 131 84 1,270,364 8,764 
Turkey 0 198 22 62,676,938 254,102 
United Kingdom 0 167,698 99,942 58,474,452 1,398,482 
Uruguay 0 653 266 3,209,825 16,233 
Venezuela 0 1,256 575 22,693,731 97,927 
Bahamas 1 7,869 2,684 285,554 4,218 
Bermuda 1 29,175 25,715 61,331 2,943 
Cayman Islands 1 63,117 72,713 35,325 1,412 
China, Hong Kong 1 11,689 4,569 6,268,693 133,165 
China, Taiwan 1 3,516 2,659 21,394,942 315,109 
Ireland 1 27,895 28,378 3,841,523 120,169 
Lebanon 1 234 60 3,502,755 12,835 
Liberia 1 568 287 2,583,089 526 
Netherlands Antilles 1 12,553 2,084 186,959 2,560 
Panama 1 4,507 1,015 2,763,603 10,269 
Singapore 1 33,731 6,550 3,653,550 78,407 
Switzerland 1 79,279 21,878 7,041,086 275,271 
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Table I (continued) 
 
Panel B: U.S. Tax Rates Over Sample Period 
Year/Date 
Ordinary 
 Rate 
Long-Term 
Capital 
Gains Rate 
2008 35 15 
2007 35 15 
2006 35 15 
2005 35 15 
2004 35 15 
5/6/2003-12/31/2003 35 15 
1/1/2003-5/5/2003 35 20 
2002 38.6 20 
2001 39.1 20 
2000 39.6 20 
1999 39.6 20 
1998 39.6 20 
5/7/1997-12/31/1997 39.6 20 
1/1/97 – 5/6/97 39.6 28 
1996 39.6 28 
1995 39.6 28 
1994 39.6 28 
1993 39.6 28 
1992 31 28 
1991 31 28 
1990 33 33 
1989 33 33 
1988 33 33 
1987 38.5 28 
1986 50 20 
1985 50 20 
1984 50 20 
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Table II 
Tests of the Effect of U.S. Tax Rates on FPI from Havens Relative to Non-Havens 
In this table, we present the results of Prais-Winsten panel regressions of U.S. inbound FPI (EQUITY or DEBT) on the interaction of HAVEN and the U.S. long-
term capital gains rate (LTCGRATE) and ordinary tax rate (ORDRATE). The specifications include control variables for the country’s annual logged GDP 
(LOGGDP), annual logged population (LOGPOP), annual domestic tax rate (LOCAL TAX RATE), annual logged landline phone coverage (LOG PHONE) and 
annual foreign exchange rate (EXCHRATE), as well as country and year-month fixed effects.  Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
indicates statistical significance at 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at 5%, and *** indicates statistical significance at 1%; one-tailed where we have 
predictions, two-tailed otherwise.  
 
 
Tests of Benefits of Tax Evasion – U.S. tax rates and investment from havens  
  Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Sign EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY DEBT DEBT DEBT DEBT 
          HAVEN*LTCG RATE + 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
HAVEN*ORD RATE + 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.039*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
LOGGDP 
 
-1.766*** -1.767*** -1.353*** -0.413*** -0.741** -0.752*** -0.693** 1.416*** 
  
(0.119) (0.117) (0.153) (0.151) (0.288) (0.287) (0.294) (0.246) 
LOGPOP 
 
0.078** 0.077** 0.227*** -0.391*** -0.060 -0.043 0.548*** 0.301*** 
  
(0.031) (0.034) (0.046) (0.042) (0.093) (0.094) (0.076) (0.075) 
LOCAL TAX RATE 
 
0.007*** 0.007*** 
  
0.023*** 0.025*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
  HAVEN*LOCAL TAX RATE 
  
0.000 
   
-0.004 
  
   
(0.002) 
   
(0.004) 
  LOG PHONE 
   
-0.024 
   
0.123* 
 
    
(0.029) 
   
(0.069) 
 EXCH RATE 
    
-0.082*** 
   
-0.042*** 
     
(0.008) 
   
(0.012) 
                  
Country Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 
Adjusted R-squared  0.978 0.978 0.970 0.982 0.853 0.853 0.856 0.908 
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Table III 
Tests of the Effect of Tax Information Exchange Agreements on FPI from Havens Relative to Non-Havens 
In this table, we present the results of Prais-Winsten panel regressions of U.S. inbound equity and debt FPI on the interaction of HAVEN and date indicator 
variables for when (if ever) the country entered into an tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) with the United States. The variables are set equal to one 
after the information sharing agreement was signed (POSTCONTRACT) and after it went to force (POSTEFFECTIVE). Panel A (Panel B) reports tests of the 
effect of the TEIA signing (effective) date on U.S. inbound FPI. The specifications include control variables for the country’s annual logged GDP (LOGGDP), 
annual logged population (LOGPOP), annual domestic tax rate (LOCAL TAX RATE), annual logged landline phone coverage (LOG PHONE) and annual foreign 
exchange rate (EXCHRATE), as well as country and year-month fixed effects.  Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical 
significance at 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at 5%, and *** indicates statistical significance at 1%; one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed 
otherwise.  
 
Panel A: Tests of Costs of Tax Evasion – TIEA signing date and investment from havens 
  Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Sign EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY DEBT DEBT DEBT DEBT 
          HAVEN*POSTCONTRACT – -0.483*** -0.475*** -0.338*** -0.537*** -0.601*** -0.591*** -0.253*** -0.433*** 
  
(0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.037) (0.060) (0.061) (0.056) (0.055) 
LOGGDP  -1.991*** -1.993*** -1.511*** -0.543*** -1.175*** -1.165*** -0.951*** 1.220*** 
  
(0.117) (0.118) (0.150) (0.150) (0.290) (0.290) (0.294) (0.246) 
LOGPOP  0.061** 0.044 0.198*** -0.454*** -0.090 -0.110 0.529*** 0.233*** 
  
(0.030) (0.032) (0.044) (0.042) (0.094) (0.094) (0.075) (0.076) 
LOCAL TAX RATE 
 
0.007*** 0.005*** 
  
0.026*** 0.024*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
  HAVEN*LOCAL TAX RATE 
  
0.004*** 
   
0.004 
  
   
(0.001) 
   
(0.004) 
  LOG PHONE 
   
0.001 
   
0.176*** 
 
    
(0.029) 
   
(0.067) 
 EXCH RATE 
    
-0.084*** 
   
-0.035*** 
     
(0.008) 
   
(0.012) 
                  
Country Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 
Adjusted R-squared  0.978 0.978 0.970 0.983 0.851 0.851 0.855 0.908 
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Table III (continued) 
Tests of the Effect of Tax Information Exchange Agreements on FPI from Havens Relative to Non-Havens 
 
Panel B: Tests of Costs of Tax Evasion – TIEA effective date and investment from havens 
  Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Sign EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY DEBT DEBT DEBT DEBT 
          HAVEN*POSTEFFECTIVE – -0.521*** -0.528*** -0.331*** -0.506*** -0.442*** -0.443*** -0.005 -0.181*** 
  
(0.036) (0.036) (0.029) (0.035) (0.066) (0.066) (0.058) (0.058) 
LOGGDP   -1.886*** -1.890*** -1.482*** -0.450*** -1.058*** -1.046*** -0.935*** 1.285*** 
  
(0.116) (0.116) (0.150) (0.148) (0.290) (0.290) (0.293) (0.243) 
LOGPOP   0.057* 0.032 0.203*** -0.444*** -0.082 -0.110 0.540*** 0.262*** 
  
(0.030) (0.032) (0.044) (0.043) (0.094) (0.094) (0.075) (0.076) 
LOCAL TAX RATE 
 
0.009*** 0.005*** 
  
0.026*** 0.023*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
  HAVEN*LOCAL TAX RATE 
  
0.006*** 
   
0.005 
  
   
(0.001) 
   
(0.004) 
  LOG PHONE 
   
0.002 
   
0.182*** 
 
    
(0.029) 
   
(0.067) 
 EXCH RATE 
    
-0.084*** 
   
-0.032*** 
     
(0.008) 
   
(0.012) 
                    
Country Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 
Adjusted R-squared   0.978 0.978 0.970 0.982 0.851 0.851 0.855 0.908 
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Table IV 
Tests of the Effect of OECD Events on FPI from Havens Relative to Non-Havens 
In this table, we present the results of Prais-Winsten panel regressions of U.S. inbound equity and debt FPI on the interaction of HAVEN and two date indicator 
variables, POST1998 and POST2001. POST1998 and POST2001 are set equal to one for all observations dated after 1998 and 2001, respectively, the years after 
the OECD increased pressure on tax havens. Panel A (Panel B) reports tests of the effect of OECD pressure in 1998 (2001). The specifications include control 
variables for the country’s annual logged GDP (LOGGDP), annual logged population (LOGPOP), annual domestic tax rate (LOCAL TAX RATE), annual logged 
landline phone coverage (LOG PHONE) and annual foreign exchange rate (EXCHRATE), as well as country and year-month fixed effects.  Panel-corrected 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at 5%, and *** indicates statistical 
significance at 1%; one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
Panel A: Tests of Costs of Tax Evasion – 1998 OECD initiative date and investment from havens 
  Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Sign EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY DEBT DEBT DEBT DEBT 
          HAVEN*POST1998 – -0.331*** -0.340*** -0.296*** -0.432*** -0.413*** -0.438*** -0.277*** -0.525*** 
  
(0.029) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030) (0.072) (0.076) (0.059) (0.060) 
LOGGDP 
 
-1.759*** -1.756*** -1.333*** -0.429*** -0.851*** -0.854*** -0.821*** 1.403*** 
  
(0.118) (0.116) (0.153) (0.151) (0.290) (0.289) (0.295) (0.246) 
LOGPOP 
 
0.114*** 0.120*** 0.242*** -0.331*** -0.046 -0.030 0.555*** 0.354*** 
  
(0.030) (0.034) (0.045) (0.042) (0.094) (0.095) (0.077) (0.075) 
LOCAL TAX RATE 
 
0.006*** 0.007*** 
  
0.023*** 0.025*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
  HAVEN*LOCAL TAX RATE 
  
-0.001 
   
-0.003 
  
   
(0.002) 
   
(0.004) 
  LOG PHONE 
   
-0.033 
   
0.149** 
 
    
(0.029) 
   
(0.069) 
 EXCH RATE 
    
-0.085*** 
   
-0.042*** 
     
(0.008) 
   
(0.013) 
                  
Country Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 
Adjusted R-squared  0.978 0.978 0.970 0.983 0.852 0.852 0.856 0.908 
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Table IV (continued) 
Tests of the Effect of OECD Events on FPI from Havens Relative to Non-Havens 
 
 
Panel B: Tests of Costs of Tax Evasion – 2001 OECD initiative date and investment from havens 
  Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Sign EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY DEBT DEBT DEBT DEBT 
          HAVEN*POST2001 – -0.329*** -0.319*** -0.271*** -0.448*** -0.389*** -0.382*** -0.615*** -0.850*** 
  
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.076) (0.078) (0.057) (0.053) 
LOGGDP 
 
-1.773*** -1.776*** -1.384*** -0.435*** -0.837*** -0.845*** -0.691** 1.424*** 
  
(0.118) (0.117) (0.152) (0.152) (0.287) (0.287) (0.294) (0.248) 
LOGPOP 
 
0.098*** 0.092*** 0.223*** -0.379*** -0.050 -0.052 0.546*** 0.322*** 
  
(0.030) (0.033) (0.045) (0.042) (0.094) (0.095) (0.076) (0.074) 
LOCAL TAX RATE 
 
0.007*** 0.006*** 
  
0.024*** 0.024*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
  HAVEN*LOCAL TAX RATE 
  
0.001 
   
0.000 
  
   
(0.002) 
   
(0.004) 
  LOG PHONE 
   
-0.018 
   
0.121* 
 
    
(0.029) 
   
(0.068) 
 EXCH RATE 
    
-0.086*** 
   
-0.049*** 
     
(0.008) 
   
(0.013) 
                  
Country Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 
Adjusted R-squared  0.978 0.978 0.970 0.982 0.851 0.851 0.855 0.908 
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Table V 
Test of the Effect of U.S. Tax Rates and Tax Information Exchange Agreements on FPI from Havens Relative to Non-Havens 
In this table, we present the results of Prais-Winsten panel regressions of U.S. inbound FPI (EQUITY or DEBT) on the interaction of HAVEN and the U.S. long-
term capital gains rate (LTCGRATE) and ordinary tax rate (ORDRATE) and the interaction of HAVEN and the contract date of TIEA (POSTCONTRACT), as 
defined in Tables III. The specifications include control variables for the country’s annual logged GDP (LOGGDP), annual logged population (LOGPOP), 
annual domestic tax rate (LOCAL TAX RATE), annual logged landline phone coverage (LOG PHONE) and annual foreign exchange rate (EXCHRATE), as well 
as country and year-month fixed effects.  Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at 10%; ** indicates 
statistical significance at 5%, and *** indicates statistical significance at 1%; one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.  
  Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Sign EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY DEBT DEBT DEBT DEBT 
          HAVEN*POSTCONTRACT – -0.393*** -0.394*** -0.231*** -0.394*** -0.393*** -0.388*** -0.011 -0.181*** 
  
(0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.035) (0.072) (0.071) (0.061) (0.058) 
HAVEN*LTCG RATE + 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
HAVEN*ORD RATE + 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
LOGGDP 
 
-1.869*** -1.873*** -1.398*** -0.482*** -0.878*** -0.886*** -0.690** 1.389*** 
  
(0.118) (0.116) (0.153) (0.150) (0.290) (0.289) (0.296) (0.248) 
LOGPOP 
 
0.052* 0.049 0.213*** -0.433*** -0.083 -0.068 0.547*** 0.281*** 
  
(0.031) (0.033) (0.045) (0.042) (0.093) (0.094) (0.076) (0.075) 
LOCAL TAX RATE 
 
0.007*** 0.007*** 
  
0.024*** 0.026*** 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
  HAVEN*LOCAL TAX RATE 
  
0.001 
   
-0.003 
  
   
(0.002) 
   
(0.004) 
  LOG PHONE 
   
-0.023 
   
0.122* 
 
    
(0.029) 
   
(0.069) 
 EXCH RATE 
    
-0.084*** 
   
-0.043*** 
     
(0.008) 
   
(0.012) 
                  
Country Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 11,271 11,271 15,606 10,115 
Adjusted R-squared  0.978 0.978 0.970 0.983 0.852 0.852 0.856 0.908 
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1
 We discuss how this works in more detail in Section I. 
2
 http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/071708PSIReport.pdf. Further, the opportunity for tax evasion 
is likely increasing over time. In recent decades, the globalization of the financial system and improvements in 
communication and technology (e.g., the internet), have made tax havens increasingly easy to access and just a 
mouse click away. For example, an online search for the phrase “open offshore investment account” will yield 
dozens pages of advertisements for such services. In addition, Guttentag and Avi-Yonah (2005) describe the ease 
with which one can open a Cayman account and support their claim by stating “as evident from any perusal of the 
back pages of The Economist magazine, where law firms advertising such services abound.”  We note that having a 
foreign account is not in itself illegal; however, failing to report the income is illegal. 
3
 By 2010, inbound FPI totaled $10.7 trillion, an amount equivalent to approximately 5% of the worldwide total of 
equity and debt (McKinsey & Company (2011), also see the 2010 treasury report found at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/shla2010r.pdf). 
4
 The U.S. does not generally tax foreign investors on capital gains from U.S. securities, nor does it tax portfolio 
interest income. It taxes dividends at special withholding tax rates, which tend to be quite stable over time and 
independent of ordinary tax rates. 
5
 Investing via a high-tax jurisdiction would subject the investor to higher foreign taxes (relative to a tax haven) and 
defeat the purpose of tax evasion. 
6
 Although these economic magnitudes are the first documented in the literature, in our minds they are best viewed 
as providing a range of estimates.  These estimates are subject to our empirical assumptions and limited to the tax 
havens we examine in this study. 
7
 These are rough estimates assuming the income would have been taxable at rates prevailing in the 2003-2008 
period, with one-half taxable at ordinary rates and one-half taxable at long-term capital gains rates and an expected 
return of 8%. 
8
 Hines (2005) examines whether tax havens prosper and finds that GDP growth in haven nations is faster than the 
growth in other countries and that haven governments are well funded. For other studies and articles on tax havens 
see Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006a, b), Dharmapala and Hines (2009), Sullivan (2004), and U.S. Senate Committee 
on Finance (2002).   
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9
 In our tests we cannot know whether the initial investment is made with taxed or untaxed dollars. We only test for 
tax evasion on the income earned on the investment.  
10
 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, July 17, 2008. 
11
 As evidence of the rigor of the fixed effects specification, the country fixed effects explain more than 80% of the 
variation in both independent and dependent variables. To the extent that alternative control variables cannot capture 
country effects, omitting the country fixed effect would induce a correlated omitted variable problem. 
12
 We include both rates for completeness and because we expect both rates to be important. We do not have 
predictions on which rate will be more important. For example, when the tax evader initially hides the money in the 
tax haven he will not have yet made any investments and likely considers an overall expected rate in his decision to 
evade. 
13
 We do not test the effect of the U.S. dividend tax rate in our main tests for several reasons. First, the U.S. dividend 
withholding rate that applies to dividend income discourages tax avoidance of dividend income (Desai and 
Dharmapala (2011)). Second, the dividend tax rate and the ordinary income tax rate were the same rate until 2003, at 
which time dividend tax rates were reduced and not linked to the ordinary rate. We do not expect tests of the 
dividend rate to be useful in our analysis because 1) the withholding rate is often greater than the dividend rate, 
which would deter, rather than promote, evasion and 2) the high correlation between ordinary income and dividend 
tax rates (1 in many years) presents an econometric issue. 
14
 http://data.un.org/Default.aspx 
15
 http://www.theodora.com/wfb/abc_world_fact_book.html. When control variables are unavailable for some years, 
we use the average of the available observations before and after the observation. 
16
 For haven countries, if the LOCAL TAX RATE is not available from these sources, we set it equal to zero.  For all 
other countries, if it is missing, the variable is set to missing. 
17
 We do not have complete coverage of LOCAL TAX RATE, LOGPHONE and EXCHRATE.  In order to maximize 
sample size, we estimate the regressions with each of these variables included separately.  If we were to include 
them all simultaneously, the sample size would decrease by about 80%.  
18
 In our sample, four havens in our sample signed TIEAs with the U.S.: Bermuda, Bahamas, Netherlands Antilles, 
and Switzerland (Switzerland’s is part of a larger tax treaty). The agreements were signed in various years, ranging 
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from 1988 - 2007. Note the Cayman Islands also signed a TIEA but we exclude them from our regression analysis 
because of concerns that the results might capture legal tax avoidance in addition to tax evasion.  
19
 The treasury reports that there are “two types of respondents to the surveys: U.S. resident issues of securities and 
U.S. resident custodians (including securities depositories) that manage the safekeeping of U.S securities for foreign 
resident entities.”    http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/shl2009r.pdf 
20
 http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/ticsecd.shtml 
21
 http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/frbul2006.pdf 
22
 The data can be accessed at the following website: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2007/910/default.htm. The estimated monthly FPI levels are subject to 
several adjustments to reduce the noise and biases in the data. We refer the reader to Bertaut and Tryon (2007) for 
extensive details.   
23
 Curcuru et al. (2011, p.4) state that the Bertraut and Tryon (2007, FRB) dataset “is the best currently available.”  
24
 http://www.thecityuk.com/media/2358/Hedge_Funds_2010.pdf 
25 
In all regressions, we correct for serial correlation in FPI using the Prais-Winsten (1954) method for panel data. 
The approach, which follows Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2011; footnote 13), uses a Prais-Winsten 
regression to account for panel-specific, first-order serial correlation, and panel-corrected standard errors to account 
for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous residual correlation across panels (Beck and Katz (1995); Blackwell 
(2005); Wooldridge (2002)). Clustering in this fixed effects model is not the appropriate solution because the model 
does not have sufficient “effective” degrees of freedom (i.e., the number of clusters will be less than the number of 
coefficients).  We thank Jeffrey Wooldridge for helpful advice in choosing the appropriate correction for residual 
correlation in our setting.    
26
 Recall that the regression is in semi-log form, so the estimated effect on equity FPI of a TIEA after the effective 
date is given by e
0.475
 – 1 = %. 
27
 We thank Jeremiah Green for sharing this dataset with us.   
 
 
 
